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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
ADVERS& Possess10N-MARKETABL& TITL&.-Land had been in the possession of P and his predecessors for twenty-eight years in such a manner
that the court found that, beyond a reasonable doubt, title had been established by adverse possession. Held, that P could give D, a purchaser, a good
and marketable title. Willer v. Hooper (Md., 1921), n5 Atl. 31.
It is now almost unanimously conceded! that a title by adverse possession is a marketable one. Scott v. Nixon, 3 Dr. & War. (Ir.) 388; Barnard
v. Brown, II2 Mich. 452; and cases cited in 38 L. R. A. (n. s.) 26. A few
cases hold the contrary. Watso1i v. Boyle, 55 Wash. 141; Lockhart v. Ferrey, 59 Ore. 179; Benso1i v. Shotwell, 87 Cal. 49. The burden is on the
vendor to show that all the elements are present which are necessary to
establish adverse possession. Simis v. McElroy, 160 N. Y. 156, 73 Am. St.
Rep. 673. Of course, if the contract of sale calls for a record title, adverse
possession is not sufficient. Nayes v. Johnson, 139 Mass. 436. It is said in
Tewksbury v. Howard, 138 Ind. 103, that "title by adverse possession is as
high as any known to the law." But, as a practical matter, it would seem
that property with a clear record title could be more readily sold than that
which has a title based solely on the legal theory of adverse possession.
For this reason it seems that the vendor should be required to use every
reasonable effort to perfect the record title before invoking the aid of equity
to force a vendee to take a title based on adverse possession. For marketable title generally, see 8 MICH. L. Rev. 493.
BoNA Fms PuRcHAS:ER-PuRcHAS:ER NOT SECURING LEGAL EsTAT&-PuRCHASER NOT PAYING FULL Pruci;.-The plaintiff contracted to sell half of a
parcel of land which he owned. By mistake the contract called for the
whole parcel. The vendee assigned the contract to the defendant, Johnson,
who fraudulently executed a land contract to an innocent purchaser, Roger- •
son (also made defendant), purporting to sell the whole parcel to him. In
a suit for reformation of the contracts it was held, that the innocent party
was a bona fide purchaser for value (not discussed) and that as against
him the plaintiff was only entitled to a lien on the unpaid purchase money,
and that upon payment to the plaintiff of the value of the land included by
mistake the latter should convey the whole parcel. Clark v. Jo/mso1i, 214
Mich. 577.
Regarding the rights of a purchaser who has obtained legal title and
paid part consideration before receiving notice of a prior equitable claim,
the American cases are in conflict. Some courts would give such a purchaser
no protection against the owner of the prior equity, except perhaps a lien
on any amount still due from the latter to the vendor. Palmer v. T¥illiams,
24 Mich. 328; Kilcrease v. Lum and Wife, 36 Miss. 56g. Others hold the
innocent purchaser entitled to remuneration for the amount paid in good
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faith. Kitteridge v. C/zapm<m, 36 Iowa 348; Beck v. Uhrich, I6 Pa. St. 499.
And others hold that the purchase is valid, the owner of the prior equity
being entitled only to a lien on the unpaid purchase money. Baldwi1i et al.
v. Sager, 70 Ill. 503; Hardin:s e:r'rs., etc., v. Harrfagto1i, etc., 74 Ky. 367.
Nor are the American cases in accord on the rule to be applied when the
purchaser pays full consideration before notice, but acquires legal title subsequent to notice. Some deny protection to such a purchaser. Cor1i v. Sims,
60 Ky. 39I; Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Boykin, 76 Ala. 560; and
references, 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (Ed. 2), §566 (p. 2I74). Others hold
the party entitled to the rights of a bona fide purchaser for value. Carroll v.
Jolmsto1i, 55 N. C. 120. See also Dueber Watch Case Mfg. Co. v. Daugherty et al., 62 Ohio St. 589; and references, 2 TIFFANY, REA:r. PROPERTY (Ed.
2), §566 (p. 2174). For a discussion of the principles underlying these rules,
see Po:MERoy's EQ. JUR. (Ed. 4), §§737-743. Where,. as in the principal case,
the purchaser has never obtained legal title (and especially where, as in this
case, the prior equity is coupled with the legal estate), the prior equity
should prevail (see Dickinso1i v. Wright, 56 Mich. 42), unless upon the theory
that the prior equity is in some respect imperfect and intrinsically inferior
to the later equity, as in Hmne v. Dixon, 37 Ohio St. 66. See also Bayley
v. Greenleaf, 7 Wheat. 46, and Campbell, Adm:r., v. Sidwell, Ex'x., et al.,
61 Ohio St. 179. In the principal case it might be said that the plaintiff's
equity of reformation is inferior because his more or less neg1igent conduct
in executing a contract which described the whole lot misled the subsequent
purchaser. An element of estoppel is involved.
CARRIERS-CUMMINS AMENDMENT-LIMITATION OF LIABILITY IN Bil.LS OF
LADING.-Eight carloads of grain shipped from grain-producing states to
Baltimore, and described in the bills of lading as "for export,'' were destroyed
in transit. Defendant railway :Paid plaintiffs, according to the terms of the
bills of lading, "the value of the grain at the time and place of shipment.''
Plaintiffs sued for "the full amount of the actual loss," claiming that under
the Cummins Amendment the stipulations in the bills of lading were null
and void. Held, not a shipment within the Cummins Amendment, because
in course of shipment to a non-adjacent foreign country, and so the stipulations are valid. Fahey v. B. & 0. R. Co. (Md., I921), 114 Atl. 905.
The limits within which the federal Act to Regulate Commerce, and· its
amendments, will apply to shipments of goods are not yet clearly drawn.
The Carmack Amendment of 1906 expressly applied to "transportation from
a point in one state to a point in another state." Just why the Cummins
Amendment of I9I5 e.'Ctended this to include transportation from or to a
point in a territory or the District of Columbia, and "to a point in an adj acent foreign country," instead: of making a comprehensive inclusion of all
interstate and foreign commerce, is not explained, but for some reason a
non-adjacent foreign country is excluded. In Galveston, etc., Ry. Co. v.
W oodb!iry, 254 U. S. 357, see 19 MICH. L. REv. 433, the Supreme Court held
that this was broad enough to cover shipment not merely to, but also from, -
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an adjacent foreign country. Such judicial legislation as this could not, of
course, go the length of including what the statute noticeably e..'Ccluded, viz.,
transportation to or from a non-adjacent foreign country. In the instant
case the question is, was this a shipment to such a country, Baltimore being
the destination named in the bill of lading, though the grain was described
as "for export"? The court hel<f that the determining factor was the intention as to destination with which the goods were accepted and delivered.
This would be true even though the real design with which the transportation was started was not disclosed in the bill of lading. "The essential
character of the commerce, not its mere accidents, should determine,'' quoted
from Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co., 227 U. S. Ill. In theory
this is sound; in practice it seems to involve liability in a sea of uncertainty.
If all shipments were under the same rule of liability there would be no
trouble, and why should ther be different rules in shipments subject to
federal control? That is for the legislature, of course, which in the Carmack Amendment, the Cummins Amendment and the Act of August, 1916,
e..'Cpressly made two classes. Most of the trouble arises because bills of
lading do not express the real or full shipping directions, especially in shipments subject to diversion before reaching destination. It seems that if the
intent of the shipper to divert the shipment before reaching destination
named in bill of lading does not appear in such bill, and is not known by
the carrier, the bill of lading is regarded as the contempla:tion of the parties
and controls the nature of the shipment, Bracht v. Sa1i A11to11io, etc., Ry.
Company, 254 U. S. 489 (Jan., 1921), even though the reshipment be later
entered on the first bill of lading, Pere Marquette Ry. Co. v. French, & Co.,
254 U. S. 538 (Jan., 1921), or the first bill be later surrendered for an intrastate bill, A., T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Harold, 241 U. S. 371, for it is not determined by the intention the shipper may have had, but which does not
find expression in any form of contract. Rice v. Oreg. Short Line R. Co.
(id., May, 1921), lg8 Pac. 16!. Moreover, the first bill of lading governs
the entire transportation, Ga., Fla. & Ala. Ry. Co. v. Blish Milling Co., 24'1
U. S. 190, including the liability of connecting carriers. Wabash R'j•. Co.
v. Holt, 263 Fed. 72. That the Cummins Amendment requires the liability
to be measured by the actual loss, notwithstanding provisions in the bill of
lading fixing the amount of the liability, is settled in C., M. & St. P. Ry.
Co. v. McCaull-Dinsmore Co., 253 U. S. 99, affirming 260 Fed. 835. The
Cummins Amendment controls not merely liability but also notice of claims
for damages. Ga., Fla. & Ala. Ry. Co. v. Blish Co., sitpra; N. Y., P. f!r
N. R. Co. v. Chandler (Va., 1921), 106 S. E. 684; Mann v. Fairfield & E. C.
Co. (N. C., 1918), g6 S. E. 731. It does not, however, extend to loss occurring after the carrier becomes a warehouseman, N. Y., P. & N. R. Co. v.
Chandler, supra, and in accord with such holding is the recent case of
Savage Factories v. Can. Northem Ry. Co. (Minn. 1921), 184 N. W. 367,
holding that provisions in bills of lading as to notice of loss do not extend
to loss of money collected on a C. 0. D. shipment and absconded with by
the agent of the carrier express company. Such losses occur after the transportation has ceased, and are not within the statute.
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CARRIERS-EVIDENCE-BURDEN oF SHOWING NEGI.IGENCE ON SHIPPER.-An
action was brought for damages due to an unreasonable delay in the delivery
of a shipment of stock. The trial court proceeded upon the theory that the
plaintiff had made a prima, facie case by showing a failure on the part of the
defendant to transport the cattle within a reasonable time, and that the defendant had the burden of showing that the delay was not due to negligence if he
were to escape liability. Held, the plaintiff had the burden of proving that the
delay was due to negligence. Bland v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (Mo., 1921),
232

s. w. 232.

Whether the burden of proving negligence is upon the carrier or the
shipper is a question upon which the courts are in conflict. The weight of
authority holds that the burden is upon the shipper. Railroad v. Reeves,
IO Wall. 176; Cochrm~ v. Dinsmore, 49 N. Y. 249; see 3 HuTCH'INSON oN
CARRIERS (Ed. 3), p. 1599, and cases there cited. These cases proceed upon
the theory that he who bases his cause of action upon negligence musf prove
it. The weight of reason, however, seems to be with the minority case~
which hold that the shipper by showing a failure to comply with the contract makes a prima facie case, and the carrier to• escape liability must prove
that he was not negligent. Berry v. Cooper, 28 Ga. 543; Hinkle v. Railway
Co., 126 N. C. 932; Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Moss, 6o Miss. 1003. The minority
cases proceed upon the theory, first, that the contract of carriage holds the
carrier liable unless the damage resulted from one of the excepted causes,
and was not due to negligence. Hence, a complete defense requires the
carrier not only to bring himself within the exemption, but; also to prove no
negligence on his part. Secondly, that negligence being a matter peculiarly
within the knowledge of the carrier, public policy requires that he should
have the burden of showing that he was free from negligence. The court
in Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Moss, supra, said: "In a large majority of cases the
witnesses are the employees whose negligence has caused the loss, and even
if known to the shipper, it may be dangerous for him to rest his case upon
their testimony, since the natural inclinations of mankind would sway them,
in narrating the circumstances, to palliate their fault by stating the occurrence in the most favorable light to themselves." Though the carrier is not
an insurer against delay, and the plaintiff's cause of action in the principal
case is founded solely upon negligence, yet the same public policy which
induces the minority cases to place the burden as to negligence on the carrier, where loss or damage is involved, also requires that the carrier have
that burden when the action is founded upon delay. To do otherwise would
in many cases deny the shipper all redress, yet the principal case adopts such
a rule.
CARRJ:ERS-TuRMINATION oF LIABII.ITY AS CARRIER AFTER Ac~ANCE BY
CONSIGNEE-UNIFORM BII.r. oF LADING.-The plaintiff was the consignee of
a carload of goods under a uniform bill of ladfog which provides: "Property
not removed by the party entitled to receive it, within 48 hours, exclusive of
legal holidays, after notice of its arrival has been duly sent or given, may
be kept in car, depot, or place of delivery of the carrier subject to a reason-
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able charge for storage and to carrier's responsibility as warehouseman
only," etc. A half hour after receiving due notice of the car's arrival and
its placement on a public delivery track the plaintiff accepted the car, broke
the seals thereon and began to unload it. During the time the plaintiff \vas
unloading (from 9:30 a. m. to 6:00 p. m.) part of the goods were stolen
from the car. Held (McReynolds, ]., dissenting), the defendant is liable
for the loss of the goods stolen. Michigaii Cent. R. Co. v. Mark Oweii &
Co. (1921), 41 Sup. Ct. 554.
The court held that by necessary implication from the provisions in the
bill of lading the liability of the carrier was to attach to goods "not removed
from the car" until the time when the liability as warehouseman should
begin. The same construction was put upon this section of the bill of lading
in Gary Bros. & Gaffke Co. v. Chicago, M. & -P. S. Ry. Co., 49 Mont.
524, where the facts show entrance and inspection but not acceptance by the
consignee. There the court said: "* * * the only thing which will e.."l:onerate
the carrier as such, within 48 hours, is the removal of the property. In other
words, the contract itself not only fixes the liability of the carrier, as such,
but defines the character of the delivery which will suffice to avoid it." In
McEntire v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., g8 Neb. 92, 828, where the consignee of goods under a similar bill of lading opened the car and without
removing any of the contents put a lock of his own upon it, the court held
there was a delivery terminating the railroad's liability as carrier. Here the
lock was only symbolic of possession and gave to the consignee less control
than that actually _possessed by the consignee in the principal case. In answer
to the plaintiff's contention that the shipping contract placed an absolute
liability upon the railroad as carrier during the 48 hours after notice until
delivery by removal from the car, the court said: "But we do not believe
the contract susceptible of this construction. A more reasonable construction seems to be that property not removed by the consignee within 48 hours
after notice of its arrival may be left in the car subject to a reasonable
charge for storage, and that the liability of the carrier shall be that of warehouseman only." In Mark Owe1i & Co. v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 214 Ill.
App. 94 whence this case was appealed, the court held that the bill of lading
was to be construed most strongly against the carrier because the carrier
was its author, Tesas & P.R. Co. v. Reiss, 183 U. S. 621, but both carriers
and shippers, with some reluctance, accepted the uniform bill of Jading now
in use in an agreement unde~ the guidance of the Interstate Commerce Comm1ss10n. Moreover, delivery to the proper party terminates a railroad's
liability as carrier. 10 C. ]. 247. Regarding this point, the court in the principal case said: "The property here was not delivered; access was only
given to it that it might be removed, and 48 hours were given for that purpose. Pending that time it was within the custcl'dy of the railroad company,
the company having the same relation to it that the company acquired by its
receipt and had during its transportation." Other courts hold the contrary.
In Rothchild Bros. v. Northern P. R. Co., 68 Wash. 27, 40 L. R. A. (n. s.)
773, the court held: "Not only had the bill of lading been surrendered and
the car spotted upon the defendant's (the railroad company's) delivery
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tracks for delivery before the fire occurred, but the plaintiff's agents had
actually reached the car with teams, had broken the ·seal of the car, and
had opened and entered it for the purpose of removing the property. This
clearly constitutes a delivery. There was not only a surrender of the right
of possession of the property by the defendant, but there was an actual
taking of the property by the plaintiff. Delivery could not have been more
complete had the wagons been actually loaded and started on their way to
the plaintiff's warehouse." In Kenny Co. v. Atlanta & W. P. R. Co., 122
Ga. 365, where the facts were similar to those of the principal case except
that the consignee had also given a receipt in full, the court held that there
' had been a delivery to the consignee and that the defendant, whose servants
had subsequently closed and sealed the car for the night, had only the duty
of a gratuitous bailee. Accord, Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Johnson, 69 Colo.
252. See also Ford v. American Express Co. et al., 203 Ill. App. 275. It
would seem that the consignee, and not the railroad, had actual custody and
possession of the goods when the loss occurred. The extraordinary liability
of the carrier arose primarily because of the opportunity for fraud by the
carrier, Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym.909, but after the consignee has
entered the car and begun to unload it the opportunity for fraud shifts from
the carrier to the consignee. The court's decision practically requires the
carrier to station a watchman at each car while the consignee is unloading it.
The decision increases the likelihood of carelessness and dishonesty on the
part of those engaged in unloading freight and tends to promote less efficient
action by the consignee in removing goods from the cars. In view of these
considerations it is doubtful whether the Interstate Commerce Commission
intended the uniform bill of lading, which it sponsored, to impose such a
burden upon the carriers, and still more doubtful that public policy can
justify it. The principal case is cited and approved in Del Signore v. Payne
(W. Va., 1921), 109 S. E. 232.
CoNS'ttru'tIONAL LAw-R.EsTRIC'tIONS oN Us~ OF STATS Mo~Ys AND
Cru;:mT-SOLDmRs' BoNus LAw.-The legislature of New York passed a Soldiers' Bonus Act which was approved by a majority of the voters of the
state. (Laws of 1920, c. 872.) The act provided for the issue of bonds by
the state, the proceeds to be given as a bonus to those who served honorably
in the military or naval service of the United States at any time during the
war, and who were, at the time of entering the service and at the time the
act took effect, residents of the state. The constitution of the state provides:
"The credit of the state shall not in any matter be given or loaned to or in
aid of any individual, association or corporation," Art. 7, §1; "Neither the
credit nor the money of the' state shall be given or loaned to or in aid of
any association, corporation or private undertaking," Art. 8, §g. Held (Cardozo and Pound, JJ., dissenting), under these provisions the act is unconstitutional. People v. Westchester County Nat. Bank (Ct. of App. N. Y.,
1921), 132 N. E. 241.
The court first pointed out that, in the absence of constitutional restric-
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tions, ta..'>:ation for the payment of a reward for past military service is valid,
being for a "public purpose." The theory is that such a reward is an incentive to patriotism and to patriotic service in the future. See 18 MICH. L.
REV. 535. The court said that the payment of money to an individual is not
a gift within the meaning of the constitutional limitations, set forth above,
if made in recognition of a moral or equitable obligation on, the part of the
state to the individual. 1lfmzro v. State, 223 N. Y. 208. It held, however,
that there was no moral obligation on the part of the state to pay extra
compensation to the contemplated beneficiaries, first, because any claim
which may exist is a national and not a state obligation, inasmuch as the
national government was the sole actor in all matters pertaining to military
service; and secondly, because the performance of military service is merely
the fulfillment of a citizen's obligation to his country, and hence any compensation over the regular military pay isi a mere gratuity. Neither of these
reasons seems sound. The court of New York has recognized the state's
"moral obligation" to make some sort of recompense to a state employee
who was injured through an unforeseen accident while acting in his employment, .Munro v. State, 223 N. Y. 208; to one who had rendered personal
services to the state, Cole v. State, 102 N. Y. 48; to volunteer firemen who
had served for a long time without pay, Trustees of Exempt Firemen's Benev.
Fund v. Roome, 93 N. Y. 313; to one whose land was reduced in value by
a change of the grade of a street, made under state authority. In re Borup,
182 N. Y. 222. Is the case of the service man substantially different? Judge
Cardozo, dissenting, said : "Their service has been coupled with sacrifice,
and from the two there is born the equity that prompts to reparation." There
would seem to be a pressing obligation to distribute the burden of these
pecuniary losses more equitably over society, to give a proportionate share
to those who remained at home reaping the harvest of war wages and war
profits. Does the obligation rest solely upon the national government?
See State v. Clausm (Wash., 1921), 194 Pac. 793, to the effect that the
state has a moral obligation to compensate for military services rendered
to the federal government. See also Second Employers' Liability Cases,
223 U. S. I, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 44; Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U. S. 34; State
v. Ha11dli1i, 38 S. D. 550. According to its own statement, the court was
not forgetful of the rule that if there is any reasonable ground for the legislative decision that a moral obligation exists the court cannot interfere.
U. S. v. Realty Co., 163 U. S. 427; Opinion of the lilstices, 175 Mass. 599.
CONSTITUTIONAL LA.w-StARCH AND St1zUM-S:i;:r.F-lNCRillIINATioN.Some detectives employed by a private corporation searched the petitioner's
office and seized his books and papers. These were turned over to the
Attorney General's office to be used as evidence in a prosecution of the
petitioner for fraudulent use of the mails. The district court had ordered
the return of the books and papers, although the court stated that the possession of the stolen property was not the result of any unlawful act on
the part of anybody representing the government of the United States.
Upon appeal by the agent of the Attorney General, held, that the retention
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of this evidence violated neither· the Fourth nor the Fifth Amendments to
the Constitution. Bitrdeait v. McDowell (1921), 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 574.
The court said that while the petitioner would have a clear right of
action against those who wrongfully took his property, still the Fourth
Amendment was not involved, because it was intended as a restraint only
upon governmental agencies. The mere retention of the evidence did not
make the government guilty of a wrongful search and seizure. This question seems not to have been decided before. Previous cases involving the
search and seizure amendment were concerned! with an actual taking by
some governmental authority, and' the questions raised were whether the
acts were unreasonable or whether they were authorized by the person
whose property was taken. In one case certain letters were taken by two
Chinese witnesses for the government in a federal prosecution. It was
held that there was not an unlawful search and seizure, because the letters
were not addressed to the defendant from whom it was claimed that they
were taken unlawfully. But the question whether these witnesses were
government agents was not discussed, as it seems it might have been. Moy
Wing Smi v. Prentis, 234 Fed. 24- The Fourth Amendment does not
expressly confine the security of the persons, houses, papers and effects of
people to security against unreasonable searches and seizures by government officers, although it does prescribe the manner of issuing warrants for
searches and seizures which shall be regarded as lawful. But this interpretation appears reasonable when it is remembered that the origin of this constitutional provision was the abuse of executive authority. Coor.1w, CoNsTI'rUTIONAI. LIMITATIONS (Ed. 6), p. 364 ff.
The court held that the Fifth Amendment was not violated by the
retention of the evidence, when the government had no part in the unlawful
taking. The reason assigned was that the government could require the
production of this evidence by subpoena, when informed of its existence in
the hands of a third person, and the petitioner could not regain its possession. However, when there has been an unlawful search and seizure, it
now appears settled that the owner of books and' papers wrongfully seized
can recover them in· a timely and direct proceeding, although the views
expressed in Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585, threw some doubt upon
this right. See 20 MICH. L. R.Ev. 93, !08. And in Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. United States, 25I U. S. 385, it was held that the government could not
subsequently acquire evidence by subpoena if its knowledge of its existence
was derived from its wrongful search and seizure. The principal case
decides that the government may retain the incriminating evidence if it is
but a step removed from the wrongdoer. And .it is not necessary that the
evidence should have been acquired by regular subpoena process. Justices
Brandeis and Holmes dissented on the ground that tfie lack of regular process
in acquiring the evidence placed government officials in an exceptional position before the law, and such irregularity would not encourage respect for
law and government. It may be that this consideration will induce the
Supreme Court to change from its position in the principal case, as it seems
to have done in that taken in the Adams case.
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CONTRACTS-LEGALITY OF A CoNTRAC'l' TO RAISE A Bm AT AN AUCTION
SALE.-Defendant agreed that if the plaintiff woul<l' raise the bid on certain
land put up at auction from $Io,250 to $n,275 he would give the plaintiff
one half of the raised bids. Plaintiff raised the bid to $u,275. The land
was knocked down to the plaintiff for $n,830. Plaintiff brings this action
to recover one half of the difference between $n,275 and $n,830. Held, as
plaintiff had broken the contract by selling the bid, he could not recover.
Jem1iugs v. Jennings (N. C., 192I), rn8 S. E. 340.
The usual definition of a puffer is the one given in Peck v. List, 23 W.
Va. 338, where it is said that a puffer is "one who, without having any
intention to purchase, is employed by the vendor at an auction to raise the
price by fictitious bids, thereby increasing competition among bidders, while
he himself is secured from risk by a secret understanding with the vendor
that he shall not be bound by his bids." The plaintiff in the principal case
made the bid with the intention of buying. This, however, should not prevent the plaintiff from being regarded as a puffer, if the bid was made
because of the inducement held out to him by the vendor, since the impliecli
warranty to the public that the price would not be screwed up by secret
machinery waSt broken. Whether the employment of a puffer by the vendor
at an auction sale is a fraud or not is in conflict. A majority of the courts
in this country hold that the use of a puffer, when no reservations are made,
is a fraud upon the public, because the purchaser at such a sale is entitled
to buy at an under value if he can do so, and that such a contrivance by
way of puffing deprives him of this right. Peck v. List, supra; 13I A. S. R.
488, and cases there cited. The minority opinion is that the vendor may
employ one puffer if he does it for the purpose of preventing a sale at a
sacrifice and not as a mere pretext for enhancing the price above the true
value. Rey11olds v. Dechattms, 24 Tex. 174; Davis v. Petway, 3 Head
(Tenn.) 667. This conflict in the American decisions is due to the different rules which were applied by the courts of equity and of law in England.
See 131 A. S. R. 488. The agreement in the principal case was a fraud,
according to the majority rule, as a matter of Jaw; while according to the
minority rule it was a question for the jury to say whether or not the agreement was to prevent a sacrifice of the property put up. In both jurisdictions, however, if a fraud had been worked upon the public the plaintiff
could not recover a share of the raised bids, because the contract, being for
the purppse of defrauding the purchaser and against public policy, was illegal and unenforceable. Dealey v. East San Mateo Land Co., 21 Cal. App. 39;
Walker y. Nightingale, 3 Bro. P. C. 263. The.conclusion at which the court
in the principal case arrived seems sound; but the plaintiff might have been
denied relief on the ground that he was a puffer, and as such could not
recover on the contract.
CoNTRAC'l's-Mu'!·uAL ASSENT-EFFEC'l' OF AN UNDERSTANDING THAT AN
ORAL AGREEMENT IS TO BE Rmuc:ED To WruTING.-Through their respective
brokers, the plaintiff and defendant entered into an oral agreement for the
chartering of plaintiff's vessel. The defendant refused to execute a formal
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charter party or to charter the ship, and plaintiff sued for damages resulting
from such refusal. Held, an enforceable contract had been entered into by
the parties, though both intended it should be reduced to writing and signed
Americmi Hawaiimi S. S. Co. v. Willf1eehr et al. (1921), 274 Fed. 214
"It is everywhere agreed to be possible for parties to enter into a binding informal or oral agreement to execute a written contract. It is also
everywhere agreed that if the parties contemplate a reduction to writing of
their agreement before it can b€ considered complete there is no contract
until the writing is signed." WlLLIS'.rON ON CoN'l'RACTS, Sec. 28. Between
_these two clear situations ambiguous ones arise which lead to differences
of opinion. The ultimate question in such cases, however, is one of fact as
to the intention of the parties. If the written draft is viewed simply as a
convenient record of an existing agreement, its absence does not affect the
binding force of the agreement, there being no regulation by statutes; but
if it is viewed as an essential part of, and a consummation of, the negotiations, there is no contract until the written draft is executed. Miss., etc.,
Steamship Co. v. Swift, 86 Me. 248; Westem Roofing Tile Co. v. Jones, 26
Okla. 209; El Reno Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Stocking, 293 Ill. 494; Prince
v. Blisard (Texas, 1919), 210 S. W. 301. See 29 L. R. A. 431 et seq. In
some cases the fact that the parties contemplated that a formal agreement
should be prepared and signed has been regarded as "some evidence" that
they did not intend to bind themselves until the agreement was reduced to
writing and signed; in others it has been considered "strong evidence" of
such a conclusion. Wharton v. Stoutenburgh, 35 N. J. Eq. 266; Rossiter v.
Miller [1878], 3 App. Cas. n24; Ridgway v. Wharto1i, 6 H. of L. Cas. 264
See 29 L. R. A. 437; Ann. Cas. 1912 B 131. In the principal case, and similar
ones, where an enforceable contract has been held to have been made without the execution of the formal contract, it is at least impliedly recognized
that the mere reference to such future formal contract does not negative
the existence of a present contract. The court in the principal case considered that the plaintiff had shown an intention on the part of the parties to
be bound by the oral agreement, and had sustained the burden of proof said
to be upon him to sustain such a contention, particular notice being given
to the fact that the defendant's manager had actually designated a place for
the ship to dock.
CON'l'RACTS-ORAL vARIA'l'ION OF WRIT'mN AGREEMENT Wl'l'HlN S'l'A'l'U'l'E
OF FRAuDs-EsroPPEL.-In a written agreement defendant promised to sell
plaintiff a certain 48ci acres of patented land, and, inter alia, to sell plaintiff
100 head of cattle to be selected by plaintiff out of defendant's herd. Plaintiff paid $soo down. A day or two after the execution of the agreement, and
nearly a month before defendant was to perform, he discovered that he could
not pass a clear title to a part of the land. Accordingly, the parties entered
into an oral adjustment as to this. While defendant was holding the cattle
to be ready to perform he had' opportunities to sell them. Before the date
of performance a severe drought occurred, causing him heavy losses on his
animals. On the date of performance plaintiff refused to complete pay-
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ment and now sues for the recovery of his deposit, claiming that the defendant is barred from setting up the revised contract because it does not satisfy
the Statute of Frauds. Judgment given for the defendant. Held, the plaintiff
was estopped. to set up the statute as to the variation. Vaugha1i v. Jackson
(N. Mex., 1921), 200 Pac. 425.
In arriving at its decision the court quotes from Kingstoti v. Walters,
16 N. Mex. 59, saying: "Where a representation as to the future relates to
an intended abandonment of an existing right and is made to influence others
and they have been influenced by it to act, it operates aSj an estoppel." This
doctrine can be traced to Insurance Co. v. Mowry, g6 U. S. 544, but it is
unnecessary to the decision of that case and is a misleading dictmn. In the
principal case, however, the court was forced to resort to some device such
as estoppel. By the great weight of authority no action will lie on an oral
variation of a written contract if the varied agreement is within the Statute
of Frauds. Odell v. Barton, 249 Fed. 6o4; Swain v. Seamens, 9 Wall. 254;
Abell v. Mimso1i, 18 Mich. 305. A contract within the Statute may be
rescinded orally. Morris v. Baron & Co., 87 L. J. R. (K. B.) 145. But as
was said in this case, it is essential that in the agreement for rescission there
be made manifest "the intention in any event of a complete extinction of the
first and formal contract, and not merely the desire of an alteration, however sweeping, in terms which still leaves it subsisting." See also Morris v.
Baron & Co. [1918], A. C. 1, commented on in 16 MICH. L. REv. 624 Apparently many courts refuse to allow any application of estoppel to avoid the
Statute of Frauds. Warren v. Mayer Mfg. Co., 16I Mo. n2; Platt v. Butcher,
II2 Cal. 634. But the better rule seems to be that one who. has induced a
breach by requesting performance to be different from that called for in
the written contract is estopped to set up this breach. The leading case taking
this view is Hickman v. Haynes, L. R. IO C. P. 5g8, in which it was held
that a buyer having by parol induced a seller, willing and able to perform,
to delay until after the time called for in the written contract was barred
from setting up the breach. In accord are Paxton v. Faxo1i, 28 Mich. 159;
Johnsoti v. Blair, 132 Ala. 128; Scheerschmidt v. Smith, 74 Minn. 224.
Tlzo111so1i v. Poor, 147 N. Y. 402, goes further and says that the party who
has consented· to a different performance is estopped to assert that there
was a breach; but there is strong authority contrary to this extension. Walter v. Bloede, 94 Md. So. The principal case must rely on the disputed doctrine that estoppel will apply as against the party merely assenting to a
request for a change in performance; but even conceding this to be the
law, the court's decision is erroneous. Where courts allow estoppel at all,
the party claiming its benefit must have been able to perform according to
the terms of the written contract and must have withheld such performance
on the faith of the other party's conduct. Stowell v. Robinson, 3 Bing. N. C.
928; Lawyer v. Post, 109 Fed. 512; Plevins v. Downing, l C. P. D. 220 (dictum); Hasbrouck v. Tappe1i, 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 200. In the principal case
it was impossible for the vendor to deliver a good patent title to the land
in question. Not having relied on the plaintiff's conduct as to acts which
he was able to perform, he is not entitled to the benefit of estoppel to deny
breach.
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CoNTRAC'l'S-STATUTE oF FRAUDS-ORAL Rssc1ss10N oF CoNTRAC'l' TO CoNVEY LAND.-Defendant, by written contract, agreed to convey real estate to
X, payment to be made in installments. After X had made some payments
an oral agreement was entered into whereby X surrendered the written contract in consideration of defendant paying back the installments paid. Plaintiff, as administrator of X, brought action, demanding specific performance
of the 4:ontract or damages. Held, the oral agreement rescinded the written
agreement to convey land and• that it was not such an agreement as under
the Statute of Frauds would need to be in writing. W angsness v. Stephenson
(S. D., 1921), 184 N. W. 362.
The general rule seems to be that if an executory contract is within the
Statute of Frauds and is in writing a subsequent oral agreement fo rescind
the contract is effectual, provided the oral agreement fulfills the requisites
- of a contract at common law. WILI.ISTON ON CoNTR.ACTS, Sec. 592. But
whether an executory contract creates an "interest" in the land on the part
of the buyer and whether a rescission of the contract is such a retransfer
as to require a writing is a much disputed question. The court in the principal case follows a line of cases which holds that the oral agreement discharging the written contract need not be in writing. Morris v. Baron
[1918], A. C. I (semble); Wttlsclmer v. Ward, II5 Ind. 219; Howard v.
Gresham,, 27 Ga. 347; Morrill v. Colehoitr, 82 Ill. 6!8. But it seems that
these courts fail to see that an equitable interest in the land has been created
by the contract. It is well settled that a promise to sell an equitable interest
in real estate is within the statute. Elli.s v. Hill, 162 Ill. 557; Spragite v.
Kimball, 213 Mass. 380; Tynan v. Warren, 53 N. J. Eq. 313; Holmes v.
Holmes, 86 N. C. 205. Thus, a contract to mortgage real estate must be in
writing. Stringfellow v. Ivie, 73 Ala. 209; Marshall v. Livermore Water Co.
(Cal.), 5 Pac. IOI; Clabaitgh v. Byerly, 7 Gill (Md.) 354. So, also, courts
have held that an assignment of a contract to convey land must be in writing
because it creates an equitable ownership in the purchaser. Connor v. Tippett, 57 Miss. 594; Hack~tt v.1 Watts, 138 Mo. 502; Meason v. Kaine, 63 Pa.
335. In the principal case, when the owner contracted to sell his land he
parted with sufficient rights of ownership to be called an equitable interest
in the land. Therefore, an oral rescission of the contract, thereby restoring
the equitable right to him who created it, should be within the statute just
the same as if the equitable right had been conveyed. Barrett v. Durbin,
rn6 Ark. 332; Catlett v. Dougherty, 21 Ill. App. u6; Dial v. Crain, IO Tex.
444; Grnnow v. Salter, II8 Mich. 148. See WILI.ISTON ON CoNTRAC'l'S, Sec. 491.
CoRPORAT'IONS-CHARTER AS A CONTRACT BETWEEN THE STATE AND THI!
CoRPORATION.-In the year 1816 the Massachusetts legislature granted a char·
ter to a religious society by a special act, reserving no power of repeal or
amendment; nor was there any general law in force at that time reserving
to it that power. In 1921 a bill was proposed in the legislature to suspend
the charter of the society. Upon its opinion being asked by the Sen~te, the
supreme court answered that the bill was in violation of Art. 1, Sec. 10, of
the United' States Constitution, which declares that "no state shall *
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pass any * * * law impairing the obligation of contracts." The grant and
acceptance of the charter constituted a contract between the commonwealth
and the society which the former could not violate. In re Opinion of the
Justices (Mass., I!)2I), I3I N. E. 29.
This doctrine was laid down in Massachusetts as early as I8o6, in Wales
v~ Stetso1i, 2 Mass. I43· But by
the leading case on the subject is Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (I8I9), 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 5I8, I
WILGUS CoRP. CASES 7o8, which Chief Justice Waite said had become so
imbedded in our jurisprudence as to be "to all intepts and purposes part of
the Constitution itself." Stone~ v. Mississippi, IOI U. S. 8I4, 2 Wn.Gus CoRP.
CASES I348. The doctrine, however, has not been free from attack. See
Toledo Bank v. Bond, I Ohio St. 622; Dow v. Northem Railroad, 67 N. H. I.
When charters of private corporations were granted by special legislative
acts, as in the Dartnumth College case, the grant could quite readily be interpreted as giving rise to a contract between the state and the corporation.
The act conferring corporate powers is in the nature of an offer on the part
of the state which may be revoked at any time before acceptance. State v.
Dawso1i, I6 Ind. 40, I Wn.Gus CoRP. CASES 4I2. Upon acceptance, the implied
agreement of the corporation to perform the duties imposed upon it is an
adequate consideration, and a binding contract is formed. Now, although
corporations are formed under general laws, this contract still arises. Abbott
v. The Jolmstoti, etc., Ry. Co., 8o N. Y. 27. In most states, as in Massachusetts (R. L. I902, c. 109, Sec. 3), the power to repeal and amemf is now
reserved to the legislature by a general law. It becomes a term of the charters, without reference to it, of all corporations subsequently organized.
Thornton v. Marginal Freight Ry. Co., I23 Mass. 32. But the charter in the
principal case was granted fifteen years before the Massachusetts statute
became operative, and' a case is presented which is becoming more and more
uncommon. The decision shows no tendency on the- part of the court to .
break away from the Dartmouth College case, but to adhere strictly to its
doctrine. See also 4 MICH. L. JoUR. 25I; 4 MICH. L. REV. 3o6; 7 ibid. 64,
201, 591 ; 9 ibid. 225.

far

CRIMES-CONSPIRACY-INDIC'.l'MEN'l'.-In a prosecution for conspiracy to
violate the National Prohibition Act, the indictment charged with conspiracy
thirty-one named persons, together with divers other persons to the grand
jurors unknown. Proffered evidence would have shown that some of the
"other persons" were known to the grand jurors.. Held, there was no error
in the rejection of the evidence, since no necessity exists for joining or
naming all the conspirators in a single indictment. United States v. Heitler,
274 Fed. 401.
A true averment that the names of the other conspirators are to the
grand jury unknown has always been held sufficient. People v. Mather, 4
Wend. 229; Cooke v. People, 23I Ill. 9. But, furthermore, it is never incumbent on the prosecution to charge all who have participated in the unlawful
undertaking, People v. Richards, 67 Cal. 412; nor is it necessary to allege
the names of all the parties to the conspiracy. State v. Lewis, I42 N. C. 626;
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contra, State v. Dreany, 65 Kan. 292. And even where it is requi~ed that the
names of all the parties to the conspiracy be alleged, it is not essential to
the sufficiency of the indictment that all such parties be jointly charged with
the commission of the offense. State v. Dreany, supra. When, as in the
principal case, the indictment charges the defendants therein named with
having conspired "with divers other persons to the said grand jurors
unknown,'' and it appears by the proof that such other persons are known
to the grand jury, the question arises as to whether this averment is a material one and the variance fatal. On this point the courts have quite uniformly held that the variance is not fatal and that the names of the parties
with whom the indicted defendants conspired are not descriptive of the
offense. Jones v. United States, 179 Fed. 584; People v. Smith, 239 Ill. 91;
People v. Mather, supra. Thus, it follows that the averment is mere surplusage. The court in the principal case subscribes to this view, but, as it
points out, quoting from the opinion in Cochran v. United States, 157 U. S.
286: "The true test is, not whether it (the indictment) might possibly have
been made more certain, but whether it contains every element of the offense
intended to be charged, and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he
must be prepared to meet."
Evm.t::NcE-0PINION BY AN ExPERT \'VITNESS ON "THE VERY Issu:e'' INADMISSIBLt.-D had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Pursuant to a statute which provided for a stay of execution until recovery of
persons becoming insane between conviction and execution, D's counsel petitioned that a jury be impaneled to try D's sanity. By the court's order three
alienists e.."amined D and at the hearing without a jury were permitted to
express their opinion as to D's sanity at the time of the examination. On
a writ of error it was held, that there should be another hearing before a
jury and that the opinions of the experts should, not be received on the very
question the jury were to pass upon. People v. Geary (Ill., 1921), 131 N.
E. 652.
Although the issue. is a bit beclouded by the suggestion that hypothetical
questions might properly be asked the experts, the question~ of the admissibility of an expert's opinion upon "the very issue" seems to be fairly raised.
Authority for the decision may be found in C. & A. R. Co. v. R. Co., 67 Ill.
145; Goddard v. Enzler, 222 Ill. 462; and Keefe v. Armoier & Co., 258 Ill. z8.
But even the Illinois court is not consistent. The issue in the instant case
is precisely the same as in the hearing on a petition to have a conservator
appointed for an alleged insane person. In such a case it has been held
that the opinion of a lay witness who was well acquainted witbi the respondent was admissible. Neely v. Shephard, 190 Ill. 637. The essence of the
objection is that such opinions usurp the function of the jury. However,
the jury is always at liberty to question not only the facts upon which the
opinion is based but also the soundness of the opinion. The reason for admitting expert opinion in matters of skill and science is to help the jury in
determining facts with which the layman is unfamiliar. This help is equally
useful whether one or several issues are to be tried. Many cases have held
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that the coincidence of the question with the very issue in the case is not
per sea ground for exclusion. Fenwick v. Bell, l C. & K. 312; ~Mansell v.
Clements, L. R. 9, C. P. 139; Ryder v. State, 100 Ga. 528; Poole v. Dea1i,
152 Mass. 589; Donnelly v. R. Co., 70 Minn. 278; Nebomie v. R. Co., 68 N.
H. 296; Littlejo/m v. Shaw, 159 N. Y. 188; Western Coal & M. Co. v. Berberich, 94 Fed. 329. See WIGMO~ oN EVIDENCE, §1921.
LIEN-Loss BY LmNoR.'s ATrACHMEN'l'.-The holder of a statutory lien
for repairs on a motor boat in his possession sued out an attachment to
enforce payment of the charges due. The sheriff levied on the property in
pursuance of this process, lienor retaining physical possession of the boat
and giving the officer a receipt for it. Held, that by causing an attachment
to be levied on the property the lienor had waived his lien. Fidelity and
Deposit Co. v. Johnson (1921), 275 Fed. n2.
A "lien is neither a jus ad rem nor a jus in re, but a simple right of
retainer. The voluntary parting with possession of goods will amount to
a waiver or surrender of the lien." Sensenbrenner v. Mathews, 48 Wis. 250.
In England as early as 1828 it was held that the lienor himself, having called
on the sheriff to sell his security, he set up no lien against the sale, and
although the property never left his physical pos'session because he purchased
it from the sheriff, he held possession by virtue of the sale and not by virtue
of the lien. Jacobs v. Latour, 5 Bing. 130. In the United States, Massachusetts and Iowa have gone deepest into the subject. The Massachusetts
view seems to be that the lienor loses his lien by surrendering to the attaching officer, unless he specifically reserves his lien. Swett v. Brown, 5 Pick.
178; Townsend v. Newell, 14 Pick. 332; Legg v. Willard, 17 Pick. 140;
Whitaker v. Sm1mer, 20 Pick. 399; Evans v. Warren, 122 Mass. 303. Substantially the same view is taken by Iowa, although it does not appear that
a lien may be reserved there through notice to the attaching officer. In
reconciling the decisions in this state which hold that a statutory material man's lien is not lost through attachment, the court says in Stein v.
llfcAuley, 147 Iowa 630: "If a lien depends upon possession and continued
possession is essential to the lien, the party holding such lien cannot surrender his possession through an attachment and then assert his lien. Citi:mi's
Bank v. Dows, 68 Iowa 46o." Contra are Arendale v. Morgan & Co., 5
Sneed. (Tenn.) 703; Lambert v. Nicklass, 45 W. Va. 527; Jones et al. v.
lro1iton Garage Co. 9 Ohio App. 431, which take the view that the lienor
does not lose his\ lien even if it is of such a nature as to depend on possession. In the latter two important cases the court fails to recognize that
under the facts legal possession passed out of the lienor by the attachment.
The reasoning of the West Virginia court on this point is the more plausible,
this tribunal assuming that the officer took possession as the lienor's agent,
so that possession did not leave the lienor. But the broad contention that
this agency exists is contrary to authority. The attaching officer is the agent
of the plaintiff only if the writ served is void on its face; otherwise he is
not the agent of the plaintiff, but the agent of the law. Wilosn v. Tummon,
I D. & L. 513. Goods, when properly attached, are strictly in the custody
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of the law and the creditor has no right of possession of the attached goods.
Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Love, 6r Kan. 433; Dollins & Co. v. Lindsey &
Co., 89 Ala. 2r7; Stemmons & Hyatts v. Kfag, 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 559. Though
the lienor may hold physical possession of the goods, he may have it only
as the agent of the officer. An attaching officer need not retain possession
of the good's, but may deliver it to a keeper or agent, whose possession will
be regarded as that of the officer. Sinsheim<{!r v. Whitely et al., III Cal. 378.
But a lien is not lost through a delivery of possession with a special agreement not to prejudice the lien. De Witt. v. Prescott, 51 Mich. 298; Gregory
v. Morris, 96 U. S. 6r9. This holds good even in case of a sale. Gregory
v. Morris, supra. Accordingly, if. the lienor specifically reserves his lien
when he surrenders possession to the officer there is no reason why he should
lose it. The case of Newell v. Smmzer, supra, can be explained as showing
this phase of the principle as laid down in the supreme court decision of
Gregory v. Morris, sztpra. But if there is no specific reservation of the lien
there is little rea-son to imply one. In the West Virginia case, supra, in
which this is done, the court stresses the point that an attachment is necessary to make the lien right of any practical value. But in this case the plaintiff reversed the proper order of procedure. Because of his lien, no one could
take the property away from him without paying the lien charges, and so he
was amply protected until he should take possession of it, after suit on the
debt, by a judgment levy. Thus, in the principal case the lienor's action was
premature if its sole purpose was to enforce lien rights practically.
SALES-MEANING OF THE WoRD SALE.-The transfer of the assets of
corporation A to a newly 0 rganized corporation B in return for stock in
corporation B at 90 per cent of the face value, held, a "sale" within a contract entitling the manager to a certain per cent of the net profits on the
sale of the company within a certain period. Board111a1i Co. v. Petch (Cal.,
r92r), r99 Pac. ro47.
Blackstone defines a sale as a transmutation of property from one man
to another in consideration of some price or recompense in value. Bk. 2
Br.,. CoM. 446. In construing statutes which use the word "sale," a strict
interpretation is sometimes given, holding that the word "sale" imports a
money consideration. So where a statute prohibited the "sale" of intoxicating liquors, giving liquor to one who returned other liquor of the same
kind and amount did not constitute a sale. Jones v. State, ro8 Miss. 530.
Accord, exchange of oleomargarine, Ewers v. Weaver, r82 Fed. 7r3. But
to constitute a sale in its broader sense, the consideration need not necessarily be money, for if title is transferred for a fixed money price, whether
it be paid in cash or in goods, it is a sale. Ullma1i v. Land, 37 Tex. Civ. App.
422. In a popular sense, the word "sale" is often used in a still broader
sense and includes those transactions where an exchange of goods is made
without reckoning their value in terms of money. Mosely v. Gordo1i, r6 Ga.
384. The broad or narrow meaning of the word will be adopted in a given
case as will best effectuate the intent of those using the word, and this
intent may be indicated by the context or the surrounding circumstances
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and the conduct of the parties. Keith v. Electrical Co., 136 Cal. 178; Mansfield v. District Agr. Ass'1i, 154 Cal. 145. In the principal case the court held
that the~e was evidence sufficient to justify a conclusion by the jury that
the transaction constituted a "sale" of the property within the meaning of
that term as used by the parties in their agreement.
TAXA'l'lON-"Do1NG Busrnr:ss."-Decedent, a wealthy non-resident, organized two corporations (one in New Jersey, the other in New York, both
having main offices in New York city) to relieve her of some of her business, and transferred to them, on credit, about $24000,000 worth of securities
and mortgages. She retained 63/125 of the stock in the New Jersey corporation (giving most of the balance to her son)~ and although not a stockholder in the New York corporation, the capital stock was held in her interest. At the time of her death in 1916 the decedent held a $55,ooo mortgage
on New York property and savings deposits at interest and credits in New
York banks and trust companies aggregating about $13,000,000. The Transfer
Tax Law, Sec. 220, subd. 2, imposes a tax upon the property of a decedent
"'"When the transfer is by will or intestate law of capital invested in business
in the state by a non-resid'ent of the state doing business in the state either
as principal or partner." Held, decedent was not "doing business" in the
state within the Transfer Tax Law. In re Gree17/s Estate (May, 1921), 23r
N. Y. 237.
Concededly, the corporations were "doing business" in New York, and
the decedent had capital invested in both of them. But unless the business
carried on by a corporation can be held to be that of its individual stockholders, the corporations' activities in selling securities, making investments,
loaning money, etc., would not warrant classifying the decedent as one
"d'oing business" in New York. In an English case Lord Denman, C. J., said:
"But as the case stands, it seems to us that the British corporation is, to all
intents, the legal owner of the vessel, and entitled to the registry, and that
we cannot notice any disqualification of an individual member which might
disable him, if owner, from registering the vessel in his own name." The
Queen, etc., v. Arnaud, 16 L. J. R. N. S. (Com. Law) 50. A recent New
York decision was to the same effect. Schulz Co. v. Raimes & Co., 166-N.
Y. Supp. 567, 100 Misc. Rep. 697. In that case 47/50 of the stock of a New
Jersey corporation was owned by alien enemies; but the court concluded
that it had no right to look behind the corporate entity to determine its character, so it did not have to decide whether or not an alien enemy could: sue
in our courts. See also Peoples Pleasure P. Co. v. Rohleder, 109 Va. 439.
The facts in Daimler Co. v. Co1itfoental Tyre and Ritbber Co., House of
Lords [1916], 2 A. C. 307, were similar to those in Schulz Co. v. Raines &
Co., supra, but it was held that the action could not be maintained. Although
some of the lords believed they had a right to look behind the corporate
entity to discover its character, it might well be said that the decision rested
upon the unanimous opinion of the Lords that the secretary who brought
suit for the corporation had no authority to do so. Whether or not holding
the mortgage and thei deposits and credits in banks and trust companies con-
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stituted "doing business" in the state presents a more difficult problem. The
Supreme Court of the United States defines "doing business" as "That which
occupies the time, attention, and labor of men for the purpose of a livelihood
or profit." Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107. Disposing of fifteen
different cases, the court held that each of the following amounted to "doing
business" : managing and leasing a hotel; leasing ore lands for mining, and
receiving a royalty; owning and leasing taxicabs, and collecting rents therefrom. In Voii Battmbach v. Sargent Land Co., 242 U. S. 503, leasing and
selling land and disposing of stumpage was held to be "doing business."
Courts usually decide that merely holding title to property and distributing
the income to stockholders is not "doing business." Zonne v. JJ1inneapolis
Syndicate, 220 U. S. I87; United States v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Realty Co.,
237 U. S. 28. And if, in addition, the corporation is making investments,
it is not "doing business." McCoach v. Minehill & S. H. R. Co., 228 U. S.
295. Generally, a single transaction is not "doing business." Potter v. The
Bank of Ithaca, 5 Hill 490; Cooper Manufactttring Co. v. Fergusoii, II3 U.
S. 727; Florslieim Bros, D. G. Co. v. Lester, 6o Ark. !20. But see Boddy v.
Contfoental Inv. Co. (Ala., 1921), 88 So. 294, where it is decided that "one
transaction will constitute a doing of business."
TORTS-LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURi;:R 'tO THIRD PARTY FOR INJURY CAUSllD
BY UNSAF!l PRoouCT.-Plaintiff bought chicken feed from a grain company
which was a purchaser and not a selling agent of defendant. The feed contained too large a quantity of salt, and when fed to the plaintiff's chickens
caused many of them to die. Held, that the plaintiff could not recover.
Tompkins v. Qiwker Oats Co. (Mass., 1921), I3l N. E. 456.
The court said, "it is a long established general rule that the manufacturer of an article is not liable to those who have no contractual relation
with him for injuries resulting from negligence in its manufacture. This
has been based on the various ·grounds of the absence of a legal duty to the
plaintiff to use care in making the article, the break in the chain of legal
causation, and the multiplicity of suits "thought likely to result if the action
were allowed." The court points out the various exceptions to the general
rule, such as negligence in the preparation of food for human consumption;
where the product is inherently dangerous, or commonly recognized as dangerous, to human life or health, such as poisonous drugs, etc. To the same
effect is another recent Massachusetts case, Windram Mfg. Co. v. Boston
Blacking Co. (I921), I3I N. E. 454, where the defendant manufactured
cement for pasting linings t0, fabrics, such cement being deleterious in character and injurious to both the linings and the fabrics. In the case of Sclwbert v. Clark Co., 49 Minn. 331, the action was brought to recover for
injuries resulting from a defective step-ladder, and the manufacturer was
held liable. In that case the court seems to have considered a step-ladder
to be of a dangerous character. An exhaustive review of the cases was
there made, but they are mostly cases of the sale of drugs and food for
human consumption. See, in this connection, the note to Craft v. Parker,
Webb & Co., g6 Mich. 245, in 21 L. R. A. 139· See also note in 27 YAI.ll L.
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J. 713. There seems to have been a tendency during the past few years to
allow a recovery where the article manufactured, while not inherently dangerous, will, if not properly constructed, be dangerous to life or health.
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382; Johnson v. Cadillac Motor
Car Co., 26! Fed. 878. A very valuable and comprehensive review of this
entire question will be found in 18 MICH. L. R. 676.
TRIAI. PRAC'l'IC£-DUTY oF COURT To !NSTRUC'l'.-The trial court refused
to give certain requests of the plaintiff as instructions. On appeal the plaintiff complained of this action, while the defendant contended that since it
did not appear from the record that the plaintiff had presented any requests
to instruct, he could not now contend that there was error at the trial.
Held, that the court is under a duty to instruct generally upon the issues
raised, even in the absence of any requests to instruct. Sietherland v. Payne,
274 Fed. 360.
The original common law rule was that the judge was under an obligation, when charging the jury, to sum up the evidence produced on both sides
and to explain the law of the subject and its application to the particular
case. BRICKWOol>'s SAcKS'l"l', !NS'l'RUC'l'IONS (Ed. 3), Sec. 153. Statutory
modifications of this rule are quite general in this country, but, aside from
these, there has come about a decided diversity of judicial opinion as to the
duty of the trial court to instruct the jury when not requested so to do.
In accord with the principal case, see Central R. R. v. Harris, 76 Ga. 501;
Mariner v. Smith, 66 Tenn. 423; Capital City Brick and Pipe Co. v. Des
Moines, 136 Ia. 243; Pierson v. Smith, 2n Mich. 292. In Owe1~ v. Owen,
22 Ia. 270, it is said : "It may be said that the counsel did not request instructions, and that therefore it was not obligatory on the court to give any.
Such a view does not accord with our conception of the functions and duties
of the judge. He should see that every case goes to the jury so that they
have clear and intelligent notions of precisely what it is that they are to
decide." At 'least, it is not reversible error for a trial court of its own
motion to instruct the jury. Carey v. Callan's Ex'r, 45 Ky. 44- The other
extreme is that the court is under no duty to present instructions to the jury
unless requested. Tetherow v. St. Joseph & Des Moines Ry. Co., 98 Mo. 74;
Burkholder v. Stahl, 58 Pa. 371; T. & P. Ry. Co. v. Volk, 151 U. S. 73;
Stuckey v. Fritsche, 77 Wis. 329; Sears v. Atlantic C. L. R. Co., 178 N. C.
285. As expressed in Owens v. Owens, supra, the theory that the judge
should instruct, though no requests are presented, is more consonant with
the idea of the duties and functions of a judicial officer. It may be conceded that in most cases it is negligence for an attorney to fail to submit
requests, yet the one who suffers by the contrary rule is not, primarily, the
attorney, but the innocent client. While in matters of drawing pleadings, in
introducing evidence, and in many other ways, the conduct of his case is in
the hands of the attorney, and the client must suffer for his neglect or
inefficiency, here, it would seem, is a case where the court should properly
do its utmost to see that justice is done both parties. It seems almost selfevident to say that the public maintains courts, not in order that appellate
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courts may theorize on matters of waiver and negligence in the conduct ot
causes in court, but_ that the jury may render a just verdict on the issues
presented by the pleadings and evidence. Yet that consideration seems to
be overlooked too often. Nor is it extreme to say that by submitting evidence to sustain his side of the issues raised by the pleadings an attorney is
impliedly requesting the court to submit the correct law on the issues thus
presented. Of course, if a court has failed to instruct, or has instructed
voluntarily but erroneously, and a verdict consistent with the law and evidence is obtained, a reversal shoµld not be granted for that reason. Ford
v. Lacey, 30 L. J. Ex. 351. Where a trial court has made a reasonable effort
to present the law bearing on the issues, and a slight error has been committed, th~ cases are all in accord that, unless a party has made a request
which would, if granted, have obviated such error, he is in no position to
complain. This question may arise where some minor phase of the evidence
has been overlooked by the judge or where unintentionally some phase of
the adversary's case has been given undue prominence. N. P. R. R. Co. v.
Mares, 123 U. S. 710; U. S. v. Goodloe,.204 Ala. 484; Livingstone v. Dole,
.184 Ia. 1340; Mahiat v. Codde, 106 Mich. 387. There is good reason for this,
as pointed out in 2 THOMPSON, TRIALS (Ed. 2), Sec. 2341: "* * * A party
cannot, by merely excepting to a charge, make it the foundation for an
assignment of error that it is indefinite or incomplete. The facts- of' the case
come to the mind of the judge as matters of first impression, and' it will
often be extremely difficult for him in the short time allowed for a trial
before a jury, and in the midst of such a trial, to prepare a series of instruc:
tions applicable to all the hypotheses presented by the evidence. * * *"

TRIA:r. PRActlct-PLAIN'tlFF's RIGH't 'tO D1sM1ss.-In a suit in equity,
after a hearing had been had before the chancellor, and he had foun'd that
complainant had no grounds for equitable relief, complainant sought to dismiss, and was refused. The defendant insisted that final judgment be rendered. This course was adopted below. On appeal, questioning the refusal
to allow complainant to withdraw, held, a litigant has no absolute right to
discontinue an action without the sanction of the court, either at law or in
equity. Beaver v. Slane (Pa., 1921), n4 Atl. 509.
It is often said that a plaintiff has an absolute right to dismiss his action
before a certain stage in the trial has been\ reached. After verdict, the rule,
almost without exception, is that a voluntary dismissal cannot be had. See
cases, 18 C. ]. u53. There is- a contrariety of opinion as! to when that stage
has been reached before verdict. At common law, originally, suit could be
dismissed as a matter of right at least before verdict rendered. Ha111Ii1i
v. Walker, 228 Mo. 6II. This rule apparently survives. Oil Co. v. Shore,
171 N. C. 51; Denem v. Houghto1i County St. Ry. Co., 150 Mich. 235; U. S.
v. N. & W. Ry. Co., n8 Fed. 554 Until the jury retires the plaintiff has
an absolute right of dismissal. Burke v. Clticago City Ry. Co., 109 Ill. App.
656. The right is absolute before a trial on the merits is begun. New Hampshire Banking Co. v. Ball, 57 Kan. 812; Heineman v. Va1i Stone, 68 N. Y. S.
803; McQueste1i v. Commonwealth, 1g8 Mass. 172. After such arbitrarily
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fixed point in the progress of the case has been reached, it is still possible
for the court in its discretion to allow the plaintiff to withdraw. Ashmead
v. Ashmead, 23 Kan. 262; McQ1testm v. Commonwealth, s11pra; Bee Biiilding
Co. v. Dalto1i, 68 Neb. 38. Other cases seem to ignore the line of distinction
between absolute right and discretionary right, here suggested, and would
make it in all cases a matter of discretion with the trial court. In Matter
Waverly Water Works, 85.N. Y. 478; Isla11d Realty Co. v. U.S., 209'Fed.
201. But if the defendant is not prejudiced there is no need for discretion
and the plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss. A1idrews v. French, 17 N. M. 615.
It is often said that a plaintiff has an absolute right to dismiss his action
where there exists no special reason why the dismissal should not be granted.
Deere & Webber Co. v. Hinckley, 20 S. D. 359. This and the discretion rule
are too general, as it too frequently requires the final word of an appellate
court to determine whether the discretion has been properly exercised, or
whether or not special reasons exist. See La11e v. Morto1i, 81 N. C. 38;
Steve11s v. The Railroads, 4 Fed. 97; Palmer v. D., L. & W. R. R., 222 Fed.
461; Palmedo v, Walto1~ Reporter Co., 183 N. Y. S. 365. The use of conditional orders of dismissal in such cases is common. Americaii Steel a11d Wire
Co. v. Mayer & Englu11d Co., 123 Fed. 204 The principal case holds that a
final decision on the merits had been reached, which precluded dismissal as
of right, and that ordinarily, when all the evidence has been submitted, a
dismissal will not be allowed. On the latter point, compare Levy v. Insurance .
Co., 159 N. Y. S. 902, which ruled to the contrary on the same state of facts.
TRusl's-Is 'l'HE Ci>s'l'ur's RtGHl' IN RE:i.r OR IN P£RSONA:r.i:?-The Vermont tax appraisers levied a tax upon the cestui's interest in a trust estate
consisting of certain securities. The cestui was a resident of Vermont and
the trustee was a non-resident. The levy was protested on the ground that
the cestui had no property within the state subject to taxation. Held, the
equitable interest of the cestui is property which the legislature may subject
to taxation. City of St. Albans v. Avery (Vt., 1921), 114 Atl. 31.
The liability of a resident cestui to property taxation on the theory that
he has a property interest within the state, even though the trustee is a nonresident, is apparently fairly well settled. In Hunt v. Perry, 165 Mass. .287,
the court sustained a· law imposing a personal property tax upon hillL In
Mag11ire v. Ta:i: Commissioner, 230 Mass. 503, affirmed in 253 U. S. 12, he
was subjected to a state income tax upon income derived from property
held in trust by a non-resident trustee. These decisions are predicated on
the theory that the cestui has a property interest in the trust estate in addition to the usual personal rights against the trustee. The interesting feature
of the decision in the principal case is the unequivocal language with which
the Vermont court repudiates the historic doctrine that the cestui's interest
is merely i1i perso11am. It says: "The beneficiaries are the substantial owners of the trust fund. They have the power to control absolutely the character of the securities comprisingi the fund and to terminate it at will. They
actually owned the securities yesterday, so to speak, and may tomorrow if
they so elect. * * * To say that, possessed of the interests and rights which
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they have under the arrangement, they have no property, is absurd." The
essence of rights in. rem is generality of claim against all the world; that
of rights in personam is restriction of claim to a definite promisor. In the
early days of uses the cestui's rights were purely in personam. However,
they gradually expanded under the protection of the courts of chancery until
in chronological succession the cestui acquired rights against purchasers with
notice, the heirs of the trustee, the dower rights of the trustee's wife, and
the trustee's creditors. This development would, without doubt, have gone
on more rapidly, and would have been carried still further, had it not been
for Lord Coke's jealousy for the common law and his antagonism to any
extension of the powers of the courts of chancery. In his own words, "a
use is only a trust or confidence reposed in some other which is not issuing
out of the land but is a thing collateral, annexed in privity to the estate of
the land and to the person touching the land. It is neither a jus fa re nor a jtis
ad rem." Both courts andl text-writers have submitted to a greater or less
extent to his legalistic reasoning, and even at the present day certain doctrines of trust law are predicated upon it. For instance, if the trustee is
barred by the Statute of Limitations from an action against one who interferes with the trust estate, the cestui is likewis.e barred, even though he be
under a disability which would ordinarily toll the statute in his favor.
Lewellfa v. Mackworth, 2 Eq. Cas. Ahr. 579; Wyclz. v. East India Co., 3 P.
Wms. 309. If he were regarded as having an interest in rem in the trust
estate, the statute would not bar his remedy. Again, the cestui has no direct
remedy against the disseisor or converter of the trust estate. He must proceed in equity to compel the trustee to take the necessary action. Hall v.
W aterma1i, 220 Ill. 56g. But the present tendency of the- law is clearly toward
recognizing the cestui's right as a composite of in perso11am rights against
the trustee and iii rem rights against all the world. See HusTON, ENFORctMENT OF DECREES IN EQUI'rY, Ch. 6, and I7 Cor.. L. R. 269 for thorough discussions of the subject. The principal case and others of its kind are good
illustrations of the modem trend of thought and of its application in trust law.
TRUSTS-PAROL TRUST IN LANDS-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-SUBSEQUENT
ADMISSIONS IN COURT BY TRUSTtt.-The defendant was the grantee of lands
by a deed absolute upon its face. The wife of the deceased grantor and the
guardian of his minor son brought a petition to have the deed set aside on
the ground that it was induced by the fraudulent representation that the
conveyance was necessary to save the property. The defendant's answer
denied the fraud and claimed absolute title in fee to the property. In open
court, however, the defendant stated, and her position was explained and
endorsed by her attorney, that she did not claim the property for herself,
but held it in trust for the wife and child of the grantor, and asked that a
trustee be appointed to carry out the trust. Held, that a trustee should be
appointed to enforce the trust according to the defendant's evidence. Brender v. Stratton (Mich., 1921), 184 N. W. 486.
It has been regarded as objectionable that the grantee should be permitted
to establish a trust in the same action in which the petitioner seeks to set
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aside the deed on the ground of fraud. In such a case it has been held that;
the verified answer of the defendant is insufficient, although the court said
it would be sufficient in case the action were to establish the trust. Hutch-inson v. Tindall, 3 N. J. Eq. 357. In that case, however, there was no evidence to support the answer and the court refused to accept an answer in
avoidance as evidence in defendant's favor. In Brender v. Stratto1i, supra,
the defendant's testimony was clear and convincing. The court was satisfied
that the land was conveyed' upon trust. If the Statute of Frauds were satisfied, therefore, there was no difficulty in making out the trust. The writing
to satisfy the Statute of Frauds need not contain "all the terms of the trust."
I7 MICH. L. REv. 266. A subsequent writing satisfies the statute, since an
oral trust in lands is not illegal. I3 HARV. L. REv. 6o8; BOGERT ON TRUSTS
(I92I), 6I. Many of the forms which such declarations may take are stated
in PERRY ON TRUSTS (Ed. 6), Sec. 82. A verified answer in chancery by the
trustee is sufficient. Sclmmacher v. Draeger, I37 Wis. 6!8; Barroti v. Barron,
:24 Vt. 375. A guardian's report is also sufficient. Snyder v. Snyder, 28o
Ill. 467. No case has been found where the testimony of a guarantee was permitted to set up an enforceable trust; and it has been held that such testimony reduced to writing does not satisfy the statute. Hasshagen v. Hasshagen, 80 Cal. 5I4- However, pleadings signed by counsel are held to constitute a sufficient memorandum. I9 MICH. L. REv. 752. In the principal
case the court emphasized the fact that there was more than the oral testimony of the defendant under oath. The defendant's attorney called the
attention of the court to the nature of her claim, although there were no
formal pleadings filed. The decision seems sound, as the disclosures made
in formal court proceedings supply an equivalent of the solemnity contemplated by the Statute of Frauds.
WILLS-RIGHT OF ACTION AS AN ESTATE ON WHICH To BASE JURISDICTION
TO GRANT LE'!'l'ERS oF Am.UNISTRATION.-Decedent, at the time of his death,
was a resident of Michigan. He suffered injury from the D railroad in
Indiana and the injury resulted in hi~ death. An administrator was
appointed in Indiana for the sole purpose of prosecuting a claim for damages. Held, a claim for damages for causing the death of a party is not
assets within the meaning of the statute authorizing the granting of letters
of administration in this state. Tri-State Loan and Trust Co. v. Lake Shore
& M. S. Ry. Co. (Ind., I92I), 131 N. E. 523.
The usual code provision is that an administrator for a non-resident may
be appointed only in the county where he leaves assets. At common law,
a cause of action for an injury to the person dies with the party injured.
To determine whether a right of action for causing death is an asset of the
intestate on which to base jurisdiction to grant letters of administration,
the particular statute giving the right should control. If the statute continues the cause of action for the injury to the deceased in favor of his personal representative, or on account of the death gives a new cause of action
for the benefit of the intestate's estate, the cases agree that this is an asset
of the intestate's estate. A recent case so holding is that of St. Louis S.
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W. Ry. Co. v. Smitha (Tex., 1921), 232 S. W. 494. There it was held that
a right of action for injury and death under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act was an estate on which administration might be granted. That act
expressly provides that actions for injury should survive. Accord, Findlay
v. Chi. & Grand Trunk Ry. Co., Io6 Mich. 700; In re Lowham/s Estate, 30
Utah 436. But if the statute gives a new cause of action to the widow or
next· of kin, even though it is to be enforced by the administrator of the
intestate, the right logically is not an asset of the intestate's estate. The
difficulty in many cases, when not expressly stated, is to determine whether
the statute gives the right to the estate of the intestate or creates a right
in the widow or next of kin. Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, and Minnesota have statutes practically identical. These statutes provide that if injury
results in death the party causing the death shall be liable; the suit must
be brought by the personal representative of the deceased·; the damages
shall be for the exclusive benefit of the widow and next of kin. In interpreting this statute, the principal case, following Jeffersonville R. R. Co. v.
Swayne's Adm'r., 26 Ind. 477, held that the damages must be measured by
the loss to the widow and next of kin caused by the death of the intestate;
that the statute therefore created an entirely new cause of action in the
widow and next of kin, and this cause of action was no part of the intestate's
estate. This interpretation was followed in Perry v. St. Joseph & Western
Ry. Co., 29 Kan. 420. On the other hand, the courts of Nebraska, Iowa, and
Minnesota emphasize that part of the statute which says that the suit must
be brought by the personal representative of the deceased, and hold that
this shows an intent that the right of action should be a part of the decedent's estate, even though the entire amount is to be paid over to the widow
or next of kin. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Bradley, 51 Neb. 596; Morris v. C., R.
I. & P., 65 Iowa 727; Hutchins v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry., 44 Minn. 5. The
practical result of the holding in Indiana and Kansas is that these courts
have no jurisdiction to appoint an administrator to enforce the claim if
the non-resident decedent had nq other assets within the state. Kansas,
however, has a provision in her code (Par. 422) which allows a foreign
administrator to come into the state and prosecute the action and thus prevent the right from being lost, Kans. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cutter, 16 Kans. 568;
although, where the injury occurred' in Kansas, suit under the Kansas law
may be denied at the domicile. Oates v. U. P. Ry. Co., 104 Mo. 514. Can
the question of jurisdiction to appoint an administrator because of lack of
assets be raised by collateral attack? In McCarroii v. N. Y. Cent. (Mass.,
1921), 131 N. E. 478, the court assumed, without deciding, that the question
of jurisdiction could be raised by such attack, but held that if the court
had jurisdiction a collateral attack could not raise the objection that someone, other than the administrator appointed, should have been appointed.
The modern tendency of the cases, however, is that the question of jurisdiction cannot be raised by collateral attack. See note, 18 L. R. A. 242.

